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IK THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAHr 1 
Plaintiff-Respondent, i 
V. 1 
KENNETH EUGENE WYNIA, : 
Defendant-Appellant. i 
t Case No. 870113-CA 
t Category Mo. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
^yBISDICTION_AND_lJATUBE_PF_EBOCEESIlJ(3 
This appeal i s from a convict ion of four drug o f f enses f 
second and third degree f e l o n i e s , after a jury t r i a l in the Third 
Jud ic ia l D i s t r i c t Court. This Court has j u r i s d i c t i o n to hear the 
appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 7 8 - 2 a - 3 ( 2 ) ( e ) ( 1 9 8 7 ) . 
51M^£^I«QZ^£^ES.fEESENTED^lLAP££M< 
1. Was defendant denied a fair trial due to 
ineffective assistance of counsel? 
2. Is the defendant entitled to reversals of his 
convictions on the basis of entrapment? 
3. Did the trial court err in admitting exhibits into 
evidence over defendant's objection that there was a defect in 
chain of custody? 
Sec* 12 IRights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person 
and by counsel, . . • • 
yDit£fl^tal££MCfiDJS£Ublliil20 
AMENDMENT VI 
In a l l criminal prosecut ions , the accused 
s h a l l enjoy the r ight • • . to have the 
Assistance of counsel for h i s defense* 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. 
INlor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property* without due 
process of law; • • • . 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts—Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties. 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, 
it is unlawful for any person knowingly and 
intentionally: 
(ii) to distribute for value or 
possess with intent to distribute for 
value a controlled or . . . substance; 
(iv) to agree, consent, offer, or 
arrange to distribute or dispense a 
controlled substance for value . . . . 
(b) Any person who violates Subsection 
(1)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in 
Schedules [Schedule] I or II is, upon 
conviction, guilty of a second degree felony, 
• • • • 
(ii) a substance classified in 
Schedules III and [or] IV, or marijuana is, 
upon conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony, . . . . 
76-2-303. Entrapment. 
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(1) It is a defense that the actor was 
entrapped into committing the offense. 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement 
otficer or a person directed by or acting in 
co-operation with the officer induces the 
commission of an offense in order to obtain 
evidence of the commission for prosecution by 
methods creating a substantial risk that the 
offense would be committed by one not 
otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely 
affording a person an opportunity to commit 
an offense does not constitute entrapment. 
• • • • 
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, 
the court shall hear evidence on the issue 
and shall determine as a matter of fact and 
law whether the defendant was entrapped to 
commit the offense. Defendants motion shall 
be made at least ten days before trial except 
the court for good cause shown may permit a 
later filing. 
(5) Should the court determine that the 
defendant was entrapped, it shall dismiss the 
case with prejudice, but if the court 
determines the defendant was not entrapped, 
such issue may be presented by the defendant 
to the jury at trial. Any order by the court 
dismissing a case based on entrapment shall 
be appealable by the state. 
77-14-6. Entrapment—Notice of claim required. 
Notice of claim of entrapment shall be 
given by the defendant in accord with § 76-2-
303. 
£JATEMENT_Q|:_TfiE_£&£J6 
Detendant, Kenneth Eugene Wynia, was charged by 
information with four counts of distribution for value, offering, 
agreeing or arranging to distribute for value, or possession with 
intent to distribute for value, a controlled substance, two 
second degree felonies (cocaine) and two third degree felonies 
(marijuana), in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8 (Supp. 
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1985) (amended 1986, 1987).1 Prior to trial, defendant, through 
trial counsel, gave notice of intent to claim the defense of 
entrapment (R. 10). On the day of trial a jury was impaneled, 
but prior to evidence being presented to the jury, a hearing was 
held before the trial court on defendant's claim of entrapment. 
Defendant's counsel called and examined the State's primary 
witnesses, undercover police officers Celeste Paquette and 
Patricia Pusey, concerning their dealings with the defendant, 
after which counsel submitted the entrapment issue to the trial 
court, at which time the court denied defendant's motion (Tr. 38-
58). After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty as charged 
on all four counts (R. 45-48). The court sentenced the defendant 
to the Utah State Prison for terms of zero to five years on the 
marijuana counts and terms of one to fifteen years on the cocaine 
counts, ordering that the cocaine counts run consecutively to 
each other and that the marijuana counts run concurrently with 
the cocaine counts. The court further ordered restitution to the 
State of Utah and Metropolitan Strike Force in the amount of 
$250.00 (R. 50). 
Respondent accepts the statement of facts set out in 
appellant's brief (App. Br. 1-5) as being an adequate general 
recitation of facts, subject to the clarifications and additions 
set out below in argument relative to each point. 
1
 The statute in effect at the time of the offenses, including 
the 1985 amendments, is reproduced in Addendum 2 of appellant's 
brief. It has since been amended again in 1986 and 1987. 
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Defendant received effective assistance of counsel. 
Further, defendant has failed to establish that he was denied 
effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he has failed to 
satisfy his burden of showing either (1) that he suffered unfair 
prejudice as a result of his counsel's performancef or (2) that 
his lawyer did not in fact render reasonably effective assistance 
of counsel. The alleged deficiencies in counsel's performance 
are explainable on the basis of trial tactics and professional 
judgment, and did not prejudice his case. 
Under the statute and Utah Supreme Court decisions 
relevant to entrapment, defendant is not entitled to reversals of 
his convictions on a theory of entrapment. He has not shown that 
the tactics used by the police fell below standards of acceptable 
police conduct, or that those tactics created a substantial risk 
that the offenses would be committed by one not otherwise ready 
to commit them. The police conduct merely afforded the defendant 
the opportunity to commit the offenses. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting the drug exhibits into evidence over defendant's 
objection. The State laid sutficient foundation to establish 
that the exhibits were in fact the drugs purchased by the 
undercover officers and that in all reasonable probability the 
proffered evidence had not been changed or altered. Under 
relevant decisions by the Utah Supreme Court concerning chain of 
custody, the evidence was properly admitted and any claimed 
defect under the facts of the instant case would go to weight and 
not to admissibility. 
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ABSBNEIIX 
DEFENDANT RECEIVED EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial 
because his trial counsel was ineffective. Specificallyf he 
claims four errors to demonstrate defense counsel's alleged 
deficient performance: (1) counsel never questioned the 
discrepancies in the testimony of the State's chief witnesses, 
(2) counsel did not highlight for the jury the acts of the 
undercover officers which, defendant asserts, constituted 
entrapment, (3) counsel did not argue the applicable law and 
facts before submitting the entrapment issue to the court in a 
pre-trial entrapment hearing, (4) counsel failed to point out to 
the jury an alleged weakness in the chain of custody once the 
court had admitted the challenged exhibits into evidence. Based 
upon counsel's alleged ineffectiveness, defendant requests a new 
trial. 
The governing legal standards applicable to a claim of 
ineffective assistance were summarized by the Utah Supreme Court 
in QQ&ianna-XjL-tlQLliS# 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983): 
Relying on Py£X_.XjL--Cll§Pt 1613 F.2d 278 (9th 
Cir. 1980)1, and other authorities, our 
recent opinion in g£a££„XjL-M3llBLQS£f Utah, 
649 P.2d 56, 58 (1982), identifies the 
following considerations necessary to 
determine whether a conviction should be 
reversed or set aside on the basis of 
ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) The 
burden of establishing inadequate 
representation is on the defendant, and 
"proof of such must be a demonstrable reality 
and not a speculative matter." £iaJtjB_JU 
M£Ni££l# 554 P.2d at 204. (2) A lawyer's 
•6-
"legi t imate exerc i se of judgment" in the 
choice of t r i a l s trategy or t a c t i c s does not 
c o n s t i t u t e i n e f f e c t i v e ass i s tance of counse l . 
£iai£^*_M£Nl££l# 554 P.2d at 205. (3) I t 
must appear that any def ic iency in the 
performance of counsel was p r e j u d i c i a l . 
Siai£-3U-fi3I£yllj# Utah, 56 0 P.2d 337, 339 
(1977); JaiaiBlllfi-XAJMXnJBIf 24 Utah 2d 19 , 
22, 465 P.2d 343, 345 (1970) . In t h i s 
context , prejudice means that without 
counse l ' s error there was a "reasonable 
l ike l ihood that there would have been a 
d i f f erent r e s u l t . . . . " £ia±£_XjL-j£iay, 601 
P.2d at 920. S imi lar ly , as we s tated in 
S±ai£_Y.t_*tellDIP££r 649 P.2d a t 58, "the 
f a i l u r e of counsel to make motions or r a i s e 
object ions which would be f u t i l e i f raised 
does not c o n s t i t u t e i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e . " 
660 P.2d at 1109. 
The standards enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court 
parallel the standards set forth by the United States Supreme 
Court in the case ot StliQkl3B3_XjL_W3shiBSi2J), 466 U.S. 668, 104 
S.Ct. 2052 (1984). In £>iii£ island # the first case decided by the 
United States Supreme Court which specifically addressed actual 
ineffectiveness of counsel, the Court fashioned a two component 
test: 
A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's 
assistance was so defective as to require 
reversal of a conviction or death sentence 
has two components. First, the defendant 
must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel 
was not functioning as the "counsel" 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show 
that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense. This requires showing that 
counsel's errors were so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a 
trial whose result is reliable. Unless a 
defendant makes both showings, it cannot be 
said that the conviction or death sentence 
resulted from a breakdown in the adversary 
process that renders the result unreliable. 
104 S. Ct. at 2064. 
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While the Cfldlauna and SiiijcJsland standards are worded 
differently, their tests are fundamentally similar. Both cases 
put the burden of proof on a defendant to prove two points. 
First, a defendant must prove that his counsel's performance was 
actually deficient (or inadequate); and, second, he must prove 
that the deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of his 
trial. 
If a defendant fails to prove that defense counsel's 
performance was actually deficient, the conviction must stand. 
Also, if a defendant fails to prove that the outcome was 
prejudiced by defense counsel's performance, the reviewing court 
should not overturn the conviction. Hence, if there is no proof 
that prejudice occurred, the reviewing court need not examine 
whether defense counsel's performance was actually deficient. 
The gjxiglslflnd Court spec i f ica l ly addressed the poss ib i l i ty of 
deciding appeals solely on the prejudice component: 
Although we have discussed the performance 
component of an ineffectiveness claim prior 
to the prejudice component, there is no 
reason for a court deciding an ineffective-
ness claim to approach the inquiry in the 
same order or even to address both components 
of the inquiry if the defendant makes an 
insufficient showing on one. In particular, 
a court need not determine whether counsel's 
performance was deficient before examining 
the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a 
result of the alleged deficiencies. The 
object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to 
grade counsel's performance. If it is easier 
to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the 
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which 
we expect will often be so, that course 
should be followed. Courts should strive to 
ensure that ineffectiveness claims not become 
so burdensome to defense counsel that the 
entire criminal justice system suffers as a 
result. 
104 S. Ct. at 1069-70. 
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The SiiicJsland Court has accurately stated several 
reasons why state courts may first examine the prejudice 
component in certain cases. Because a defendant must prove both 
components of the test (deficient performance and prejudice), the 
failure to prove one prohibits reversal of the conviction. Also 
valid is the Court's statement that first examining the prejudice 
component will help the criminal justice system by avoiding the 
negative effects of grading defense counsel1s performance. 
Perhaps most important is the Court's practical statement that 
first examining the prejudice component will simply be easier for 
the reviewing court in many instances. Of course, in those cases 
where it is difficult to determine whether prejudice resulted, 
the reviewing court would necessarily, and properly, spend 
significant time deciding whether defense counsel's performance 
was deficient. However, in those cases where counsel's 
performance clearly had not prejudiced the result, the reviewing 
court could avoid the difficult and time-consuming process 
involved in examining the sometimes multiplicitious allegations 
of deficient performance. 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should reject 
defendant's ineffective assistance claim for lack of prejudice. 
Clearly, the alleged errors of defense counsel, even if true, are 
not sufficient to have prejudiced the outcome of his trial. 
Alternatively, counsel's performance was not deficient under 
applicable legal standards. 
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A. DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO PROVE THAT 
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE PREJUDICED 
THE OUTCOME. 
In CfldiaDJl§r t h e Utah Supreme Court d e f i n e d p r e j u d i c e 
in i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s c a s e s t o mean a defendant must show t h a t 
w i t h o u t c o u n s e l ' s error t h e r e was a "reasonable l i k e l i h o o d t h a t 
t h e r e would have been a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t * . . ." 660 P.2d a t 
1109; c i t i n g £JtaJt£_Xx_£lfly, 601 P.2d 918 (Utah 1 9 7 9 ) . The 
standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in 
££li£JSi3Hi3 i s very s i m i l a r : 
The defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel%s unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceedings would have been different. 
A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome. 
104 S. Ct. at 2068. 
Defendant first asserts that defense counsel never 
questioned the State's primary witnesses and undercover officers, 
Celleste Paquette and Patricia Pusey, regarding the discrepancy 
as to when the defendant allegedly gave cocaine to Pusey on 
January 3. In citing to the record in his brief, defendant fails 
to point out that the discrepancy in testimony was brought out 
not only by the prosecutor on direct examination of Paquette (Tr. 
88) and Pusey (Tr. 132), but also highlighted by his counsel on 
cross-examination of Paquette (Tr# 101) and Pusey (Tr. 142-43). 
Having made the most of such discrepancy without giving the 
witnesses the direct opportunity to explain it or to modify their 
testimony, counsel was in a position to argue and did in fact 
argue the discrepancy to the jury during his closing argument 
-10-
(Tr. 188-89) . It is difficult to see what could have been 
accomplished by questioning the witnesses further on the subject. 
As a sub-point, defendant says that his counsel did not 
note the discrepancy between the officers1 testimony as to who 
first initiated the discussion regarding cocaine on January 10. 
Specifically, defendant states that while Pusey said she 
initiated that conversation (Tr. 146) , Paquette testified that 
the defendant did (Tr* 90). On cross-examination by defense 
counsel, however, Paquette admitted that it could have possibly 
been Pusey who first requested cocaine from the defendant (Tr. 
105)• Defense counsel therefore adequately handled the prior 
discrepancy through Paquette's concession on cross-examination, 
and thereatter argued to the jury in closing that all 
conversations concerning drugs were initiated by the officers 
rather than by defendant (Tr. 190)• 
As to defendant's argument that where entrapment is 
raised as a defense, the discrepancy in testimony is particularly 
important, the argument is not well taken in the instant case. 
The only real discrepancy in testimony concerns the exact 
location of the cocaine transfer between the defendant and Pusey 
on January 3, 1986. While it may always be helpful in 
undermining credibility generally to discover and emphasize any 
discrepancy in testimony, as defendant's trial counsel did in his 
closing argument, the discrepancy here is not particularly 
germaine to the entrapment issue, which focuses on the propriety 
of the officers1 conduct, as will be more fully discussed under 
Point II. The propriety of the officers' conduct does not hinge 
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on whether defendant passed the bundle of cocaine to Pusey in the 
parking lot or after they got into the car* The issue of who 
initiated conversation concerning drugs, on the other hand, would 
be germaine to the entrapment issue, but, as mentioned above, 
defense counsel adequately handled Paquette's direct testimony 
that defendant initiated the conversation concerning cocaine by 
obtaining a concession from her on cross-examination that it 
could have been Pusey who first requested the cocaine. 
Defendant next contends that his counsel did not 
highlight to the jury in closing argument the acts of the 
officers which he claims constituted entrapment* His counsel did 
argue that the defendant was entrapped, read to the jury the 
instruction concerning the defense of entrapment, and focused on 
his main point, namely, that it was not the defendant but the 
officers who initiated all conversations concerning drugs (Tr. 
190-91). The fact is that the defendant had a very meager case 
on entrapment, as will be more fully analyzed under Point II. 
There was little which his counsel could argue in good faith 
based on the evidence adduced at trial. 
Defendant's next point concerns the pre-trial 
entrapment hearing in which, following his taking testimony from 
Paquette and Pusey, defense counsel did not argue the applicable 
law and facts before submitting the entrapment issue to the 
court. In determining potential prejudice in this regard, it is 
first noteworthy that counsel did preserve the entrapment issue 
for trial in two particulars. First, he filed a written motion 
and gave notice ot his intent to rely on the defense of 
-12-
entrapment and did so at least 10 days prior to trial as required 
by Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-303(4), which provides: 
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, 
the court shall hear evidence on the issue 
and determine as a matter of fact and law 
whether the defendant was entrapped to commit 
the offense. Defendant's motion shall be 
made at least ten days before trial except 
the court for good cause shown may permit a 
later filing. 
A perusal of the court file shows that defense 
counsel's Motion for Defendant to Claim Entrapment as a Defense 
and Notice was dated August 5, 1986, and stamped "filed" by the 
Tooele County Clerk's office on August 7, 1986 (Tr. 10). The 
court's minute entry of July 14, 1986 (R. 9) shows that the trial 
was scheduled for August 28, 1986, which was in fact the date the 
trial began. Thus there is no question that counsel complied 
with the 10-day notice requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-
303(4) which is mandated by Utah Code Ann. S 77-14-6, which 
states: "Notice of a claim of entrapment shall be given by the 
defendant in accord with § 76-2-303." 
Secondly, a hearing was held before the court on the 
motion prior, to the taking of evidence at his jury trial on 
August 28, 1986 (Tr. 38-58). At that hearing, defense counsel 
called both undercover officers as witnesses and elicited 
information which might bear on the issue of entrapment. After 
the court denied his motion, defense counsel stated that the main 
reason he brought the entrapment motion was so that he could 
raise the issue before the jury (Tr. 58). This demonstrates 
counsel's knowledge of the entrapment section of the criminal 
code which provides in § 76-2-303(5), in pertinent part: ". . . 
-13-
but if the court determines the defendant was not entrapped, such 
issue may be presented by the defendant to the jury at trial • . 
• • 
It is thus clear from the record that defense counsel 
did a competent job in preserving the entrapment issue for trial 
by giving proper notice and conducting a hearing before the court 
on the entrapment issue. 
The fact that defense counsel submitted the issue of 
entrapment to the court without argument did not result in 
prejudice to his case. As will be discussed under Point II, the 
facts of this case simply do not suggest a viable entrapment 
defense based upon the applicable law. Counsel was not 
constrained to go through the motions of arguing a futile motion 
before the court where defendant was clearly not entrapped as a 
matter of law. £>££ £ia££_^-MallDI£LS£# 649 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 
1982), cited in Codianna v. Morris, £££££• Even were his case a 
better one for entrapment, defense counsel1s submitting the issue 
to the court without argument after the two witnesses testified 
would not likely have affected the outcome of the motion absent 
an indication from the court that it desired clarification of the 
law of entrapment before rendering a decision. The issues were 
not complicated or complex, nor was the testimony of the two 
witnesses lengthy (Tr. 39-58). 
Defendant's next argument is that his counsel erred in 
not pointing out to the jury the weakness in the chain of custody 
of the drugs after the court admitted the evidence. As will be 
discussed under Point III, below, the chain of custody was 
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adequately established, and there was no indication that any of 
the exhibits had been tampered with or altered in any way. Still, 
defense counsel did attempt to keep out the proffered evidence by 
objecting to its admission before the jury on the basis of an 
alleged defect in chain of custody (Tr. 85-86, 164-65, 176). 
Contrary to defendant's assertion that it was defense counsel's 
"duty to point out the weakness in the evidence to the jury" 
(App. Br. 8), it could equally be argued that his decision not to 
do so was based on a legitimate exercise of judgment in order to 
maintain credibility with the jury in arguing his other points. 
A lawyer's "legitimate exercise of judgment 
"in the choice of trial strategy or tactics 
that did not produce the anticipated result 
does not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
£fl&UDIL3f 660 P. 2d a t 1109 c i t i n g £ia£e_X*_£?cNi£fii, 554 P. 2d 2 0 3 , 
205 (Utah 1 9 7 6 ) . 
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that defendant's 
claim of prejudice is speculative at best, and that he has failed 
to satisfy his burden of showing that he suffered unfair 
prejudice as a result of any one or more of the alleged 
deficiencies. 
B. DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO PROVE DEFENSE 
COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE WAS ACTUALLY 
INEFFECTIVE. 
While t h e Court can d e c i d e t h i s appeal s o l e l y on l a c k 
of p r e j u d i c e , de fendant has a l s o f a i l e d t o prove t h a t d e f e n s e 
c o u n s e l ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n was d e f i c i e n t . The Utah Supreme Court 
i n £fi<3iflDDfi s t a t e d t h a t proof of inadequate r e p r e s e n t a t i o n "must 
be a demonstrable r e a l i t y and n o t a s p e c u l a t i v e m a t t e r . " 660 
- 1 5 -
P.2d at 1109; citing £JtaJt£_JU_M£lLi££lr 554 P.2d at 204. The 
United States Supreme Court in JSilicJSljand stated that the proper 
standard for judging attorney performance is "reasonably 
effective assistance." 104 S. Ct. at 2064; &££ £l£2 ££dianfl3r 
660 P.2d at 1109. The SitijcJsIan^  Court declined to create more 
specific guidelines, believing the broader standard of 
reasonableness, when considered with all the circumstances of a 
particular case, was more appropriate. IsJ. at 2065. However, 
the SilicJsLsnd court specifically stated the reviewing courts 
should be highly deferential to defense counsel: 
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance 
must be highly deferential. It is all too 
tempting for a defendant to second-guess 
counsel's assistance after conviction or 
adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for 
a court, examining counsel's defense after it 
has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a 
particular act or omission of counsel was 
unreasonable. (Citation omitted.) A fair 
assessment of attorney performance requires 
that every etfort be made to eliminate the 
distorting effects of hindsight, to 
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's 
challenged conduct, and to evaluate the 
conduct from counsel's perspective at the 
time. Because of the difficulties inherent 
in making the evaluation, a court must 
indulge a strong presumption that counsel's 
conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance. 
104 S. Ct. at 1065-66. 
As pointed out above, defense counsel provided 
defendant with constitutionally sutficient assistance of counsel. 
All alleged deficiencies have been discussed above and are 
explainable on the basis of trial tactics and professional 
judgment. 
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In his opening statement to the jury, defense counsel 
vowed to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the 
law and to the best of his ability (Tr. 71). While appellate 
counsel mayf in retrospectf find things in the record that might 
have been done differentlyr that record reflects that the 
defendant received "the skill, judgment and diligence of a 
reasonably competent defense attorney." Dyer_y* Qiisp. 613 F.2d 
275, 278 (10th Cir. 1980) (en banc). 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant has not met his 
burden of proof in showing that defense counsel failed to render 
reasonably effective assistance as required by the federal and 
Utah Constitutions. 
SQIBUL2 
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO HAVE HIS 
CONVICTIONS REVERSED ON THE BASIS OF 
ENTRAPMENT. 
Defendant argues that he is entitled to reversals of 
his convictions because the undercover officers entrapped him. 
After a brief discussion of the law of entrapment in Utah, the 
entrapment claim will be addressed as it relates to the facts of 
the case. 
A. IhS-bsslisablS-Iiax 
UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-2-303(1) (1978) states: 
It is a defense that the actor was 
entrapped into committing the offense. 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement 
officer or a person directed by or acting in 
co-operation with the otficer induces the 
commission of an offense in order to obtain 
evidence of the commission for prosecution by 
methods creating a substantial risk that the 
offense would be committed by one not 
otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely 
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atfording a person an opportunity to commit 
an offense does not constitute entrapment. 
This section is patterned atter Model Penal Code S 2.13(1), which 
sets forth a purely objective test of entrapment. £QQ State yft 
laylfilr 599 P.2d 496, 502-03 (Utah 1979); Perkins and Boycef 
£LiminalJba$ 1171 (3d ed. 1982). In Ijylfli, the Utah Supreme 
Court provided a clear definition of the objective test: 
Under the objective view of entrapment, 
the focus is not on the propensities and 
predisposition of the specific defendant but 
on whether the police conduct revealed in the 
particular case falls below standards, to 
which common feelings respond, for the proper 
use of governmental power. This concept 
establishes entrapment on its historical 
basis, the refusal to countenance a 
perversion of justice by government 
misconduct. The objective view provides a 
solid definitive standard upon which the 
defense can rest, i.e., does the conduct of 
the government comport with a fair and 
honorable administration of justice? 
599 P.2d at 500. The objective test focuses entirely on the 
conduct of the police and their helpers; matters such as the 
defendant's character, his predisposition to commit the offense, 
and his subjective intent are irrelevant. Id. at 503; SJtaifi-V^  
IxisJsSfiBr 72.2 P.2d 756, 758 (Utah 1986); &Xa££_X±_£Ll2BSi 692 
P.2d 747, 750 n. 3 (Utah 1984); ££fiplfi_:5U_B3II.323r 153 Cal. Rptr. 
459, 468, 591 P.2d 947, 956 (1979); Perkins and Boyce, .SJJPILS at 
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1171.* 
Notwithstanding the clear definition of the objective 
test provided in Tgylpr, the Supreme Courtf in some of its recent 
entrapment casesf has not always been particularly careful in 
applying the objective test, seemingly reincorporating the 
•predisposition" element ot the subjective test. For example, in 
State YJSpyague* 680 P.2d 404 (Utah 1984), the Court stated: 
[W]e concluded that the offense was induced 
by the persistent requests by [the undercover 
agent], nQ±_bY-£h£-inii,ia£ix£-£n£-££2ii£-Ql 
j3£f£D£ldIL£« 
680 P.2d a t 406 (emphasis a d d e d ) . In S£a£g_x.i._GlAPEj5# the Court 
a t one p o i n t conc luded: 
T h e r e f o r e , on ly p o l i c e conduct t h a t "entraps" 
Jth2£fi«I£a^y-flBd^HilliDS_tfi-£5ffifl)ii«ill£.£XilD£ 
lS_££££p££kl£* 
692 P.2d at 750. These statements, which do not appear to be 
consistent with either the language of S 76-2-303(1) or the 
interpretation of that statute in Taylo;, are at best confusing. 
Presumably, they are not intended to modify JP^ ylfiX in such a way 
as to create a hybrid objective/subjective test. Seq Cripps, 692 
P.2d at 750 n. 3. ££. l3yl£Ir 599 P.2d at 504 (Hall, J., 
2 The subjective test of entrapment focuses primarily on the 
defendants predisposition to commit the offense. J^ylfil, 599 
P.2d at 501. Under this test, the defense of entrapment is 
denied to defendants who had a preexisting criminal intent, no 
matter how overreaching the law enforcement activity may have 
been. State v. Pacheco, 13 Utah 2d 148, 151, 369 P.2d 494, 496 
(1962); People v. Mclntire, 153 Cal. Rptr. 237, 239, 591 P.2d 
527, 529 (1979). 
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concurring in r e s u l t ) . 3 
Therefore, i t i s important for t h i s Court to avoid the 
problems experienced by the Supreme Court in t h i s area and to 
apply the objec t ive t e s t in s t r i c t accordance with Utah f s 
entrapment s t a t u t e . Two Supreme Court cases — St3te Vjr_MaiJfclDr 
713 P.2d 60 (Utah 1986) , and £jtaJt£_JU_£li£]s££S, 722 P.2d at 758-
59 — are e x c e l l e n t examples of the objec t ive t e s t properly 
defined and appl ied , as i s a recent case from the Utah Court of 
Appeals, S U t C V j ..Bright* 65 Ut. Adv. Rep. 25 (1987) . 
3 A recent entrapment decision, State v. Kaufman, 52 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 30, 734 P.2d 465 (1987), where the Supreme Court appears to 
have again strayed from a true application of the objective test, 
drew the following criticism from one legal commentator: 
This case is another decision where the 
Supreme Court speaks in terms of the 
objective standard of entrapment but actually 
applies a subjective standard. Whether the 
offenses were committed because of inducement 
of the undercover officer is not the 
standard. The standard is whether the 
conduct of the officer was such that it would 
induce a person to commit an offense they 
otherwise would not commit. The opinion 
simply does not focus on what conduct the 
otficer engaged in that was inappropriate. 
The trial court1s remarks appear to be no 
more than sexist gratuities and offer little 
guidance as to what conduct is proper and 
what is not. It is apparent from the 
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court that it 
is never going to deal with the objective 
standard of entrapment in the way that 
concept was intended to be applied. The 
better approach would be for the Legislature 
to repeal the entrapment statute and start 
over with a sounder statement of when a 
defendant should be able to claim such a 
defense. 
Boyce, "Supreme Court Summaries," Intermountain Commercial 
Record, Feb. 27, 1987, at 36, col. 2. 
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B • Pfif findflu ils.EBiijSpiDjBLi-ClaiJB 
Defendant contends that he was entrapped because the 
undercover officers were female, because they met the defendant 
in a social setting, may have bought him drinks, had no prior 
reason to suspect him of drug dealing, and because the officers 
initiated the conversation about drugs. 
In evaluating defendants entrapment claim, the 
following language from fftatft v. Tayloy is instructive: 
Extreme pleas of desperate illness or appeals 
based primarily on sympathy, pity, or close 
personal friendship, or offers of inordinate 
sums of money are examples, depending on an 
evaluation of the circumstances in each case, 
ot what might constitute prohibited police 
conduct. In evaluating the course of conduct 
between the government representative and the 
defendant, the transactions leading up to the 
offense, the interaction between the agent 
and the defendant, and the response to the 
inducements of the agent, are all to be 
considered in judging what the effect of the 
governmental agent's conduct would be on a 
normal person. 
Tflyl£I# 599 P.2d at 503. 
An examination of the officers1 conduct as to each date 
defendant sold or arranged for the sale of drugs reveals no 
improper conduct on their part, no extreme pleas, no exploitation 
of any close personal friendship, no high-pressure tactics, and 
no unfair exploitation of the fact that they were females making 
contact with the defendant in a social setting. It is helpful to 
examine the officers1 conduct separately as to each date. 
Detective Paquette testified that she and Pusey went to 
the Bowling Alley Lounge about 9:00 p.m. Paquette had a 
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conversation with another individual named Tony. They discussed 
partying and drugs, and when Paquette said she was interested in 
some good "smoke," meaning marijuana, Tony told her he could get 
some marijuana at the drop of a hat (Tr. 40-41). Tony thereafter 
brought defendant over to her and introduced defendant as his 
connection at which time defendant and Tony negotiated to sell 
Paquette 1/4 ounce of marijuana for $30.00 (Tr. 41). Paquette 
further testified that this was an average price (Tr. 49). She 
also testified that she did not represent herself to be a drug 
addict (Tr. 52), that she and Pusey dressed casually in levis and 
a blouse so that they wouldn't stand out (Tr. 50), and that they 
had a cover story to cut off any advances that might have been 
made (Tr. 51). Paquette further testified that she only had to 
ask for marijuana one time (Tr. 52). 
As to the cocaine transaction of January 3, 1986, 
detective Pusey testified that she only made one request of the 
defendant (Tr. 56, 136), and that unbeknownst to Pusey, Paquette 
had set up a separate purchase of marijuana from defendant (Tr. 
56). Pusey further testified that she paid $40.00 for a 1/4 gram, 
of cocaine which was "a little bit high," but that it was 
supposed to be good quality and that defendant was the one who 
set the price (Tr. 140-41). Finally, Pusey testified that she 
offered no favors or anything other than the purchase price for 
the drugs (Tr. 141). The record reflects no more than casual 
social contacts between defendant and the officers. 
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2. JaDiifliy«Ifl^.l5i£« iLansaQilon 
Detective Pusey testified that she and Paquette saw 
defendant at the Sandbagger Lounge, that she asked him if he 
could get her some "cola," or cocaine, that he arranged an 
introduction to another man named Matt, and that Matt sold her 
1/4 gram of cocaine for $35.00 (Tr. 137-38). 
Detective Paquette testified that during the 
conversation in which defendant discussed cocaine with Pusey, he 
also had a conversation with Paquette concerning marijuana (Tr. 
90)• Paquette testified that after she witnessed the cocaine 
transaction, defendant told her that they could go pick up the 
marijuana (Tr. 92), after which she drove at defendant's 
direction to a trailer court where defendant arranged for a 
marijuana sale between Paquette and a woman named Sherry from 
whom Paquette purchased 1/4 ounce and 1/8 ounce of marijuana for 
$45.00 (Tr. 94). 
Detective Pusey testified that on both dates she drank 
two to three beers and that the alcohol she consumed had no 
effect on her ability to recall events (Tr. 146-47) • She also 
testified that the reason that she and Paquette drank the beer 
was in order to fit into their surroundings (Tr. 148). In 
response to defense counsel's question as to whether they had 
purchased any drinks for defendant, Pusey stated that she could 
not remember, but that "sometimes we do that because they'll buy 
us a beer, we'll buy them a beer" (Tr. 149). Although Pusey 
could not specifically recall whether they had purchased any beer 
for defendant on January 3 and January 10, 1986, she conceded 
that it was "possible" (Tr. 150). 
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Defendant cites £i3i£_2jL_ite.UXk£l&S# 680 P.2d 40 4 (Utah 
1984), in support of his claim that since the otficers first 
suggested purchasing drugs from defendant and since they had no 
reason to suspect that he had previously dealt drugs, he was 
entrapped by the officers1 conduct. In Konrfrelflg, however, the 
undercover otficer not only first suggested the purchase of 
marijuana but after two weeks had passed, he "renewed the contact 
and the request, which he followed up by calling the defendant at 
least five times in attempting to purchase the marijuana." 
JSSJJlfesl&S 621 P.2d at 1240. As noted abovef no such persistence 
or prodding was employed in the instant case. 
Defendant's reliance on State Yt__gprggyigy 680 P.2d 404 
(Utah 1984) is also misplaced, for the same reasons stated above. 
In SSL^2ii&i repeated and persistent requests of the undercover 
officer were used in order to induce the defendant to sell 
marijuana. None such were employed in the instant case. 
Another case upon which defendant relies is £iai£_YA 
EautmaUi 734 P.2d 465 (Utah 1987), a "sting" case in which an 
attractive undercover officer, representing herself to be a 
divorced woman supporting six children, sold items to the 
defendant at his jewelry store. The first three times she sold 
jewelry, she represented to the defendant that it was her own and 
was not stolen. Thereafter when the undercover officer set up a 
meeting with the defendant, defendant made overtones for a more 
intimate relationship. The defendant thereafter expressed 
reluctance about becoming implicated in illegal activity when the 
undercover officer openly broached the subject, and suggested 
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that the officer might be setting him up. At a later time he 
lamented that the officer had not visited him while he was in the 
hospital. He also offered to loan her some money on more than 
one occasion. The trial court concluded that the officer "was 
not just selling stolen merchandise, but was selling herself as 
an attractive, relatively young, divorced mother of six children 
who was having hard times." Kaufmar># 734 P.2d at 468. The Utah 
Supreme Court attirmed the trial court's conclusion that under 
the objective standard set out in Xaylfii, the defendant was 
entrapped. 
In the instant case there are no indications that the 
undercover officers were "selling themselves" in order to induce 
the defendant to commit the offenses. The record is devoid of 
any suggestion of romantic involvement or that close personal 
friendship were ever fostered or formed. In fact, the officers 
had a "cover story" to cut off any such intentions, and no dating 
or sexual advances of any kind occurred on either occasion (Tr. 
57). 
Defendant's attempt to equate the conduct of the 
otficer in K&ufjDfln with that of Paquette and Pusey in the instant 
case does not stand up to scrutiny. He alleges that the officers 
used similar tactics to "fit in" at the bowling alley, and to 
induce the defendant to obtain drugs for them (App. Br. 11). Yet 
in the instant case defendant arranged to sell and/or sold drugs 
to each undercover officer independently the first time he ever 
met them. He did so again a week later. On each occasion the 
officers only had to ask once. No high-pressure tactics were 
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employed, there was no pre-existing relationship between themf no 
appeals to friendship, sympathy, pity or the like, no offer of 
inordinate sums of money, in short, nothing but the fact that 
they were casual recent acquaintances who indicated a common 
interest in drugs. The fact that the officers may have first 
asked about the drugs does not make this a case of entrapment. 
It is well established that conduct that merely affords a person 
an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute 
entrapment. Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-303(1); gj;gte,;A^ TflyIQI , 599 
P.2d 496 (Utah 1979). 
It should also be noted that on January 3, 1986, 
Paquette1s first contact with defendant was when Tony brought 
defendant over and introduced him to Paquette as his marijuana 
connection. This occurred just after Paquette asked Tony if he 
could get any marijuana, and Tony told her he could get some at 
the drop of a hat (Tr. 41). Thus there was no prior social 
interaction between Paquette and defendant. Defendant was 
brought in by Tony as part of a business transaction for the sale 
of marijuana. This is in contrast to the situation where an 
undercover officer attempts to first befriend a suspect and 
slowly works up over time to requesting illegal activity "for 
friendship's sake," or, for example, in order to alleviate some 
kind of hardship or suffering. S&£ Jaylfllf s^pna, and Raufpiapt 
Defendant asserts as part of his entrapment claim that 
"the officers were female and in all likelihood their sex 
assisted in making the acquaintance of defendant and others at 
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the bar" (App. Br. 10). The fact that the officers were female 
is of marginal relevance under the facts of the present case. 
His argument appears to be that whenever a suspect is involved in 
a drug deal with someone of the opposite sex, that suspect has 
been entrapped as a matter of law. It is an attempt to bootstrap 
the improper conduct of using one's sex and attractiveness to 
induce illegal conduct, such as that which occurred in Kaufman* 
SJJPJLfl* to the neutral conduct of the present case, where nothing 
ot the sort occurred. Heref the defendant was not improperly 
induced to commit the offense, but was merely given an 
opportunity to do so. 
Under all the facts and circumstances of the instant 
case# the otficers1 conduct, under the objective standard of 
entrapment, was a proper use of government power, and comported 
"with a fair and honorable administration of justice" Jjgylfii, 599 
P.2d at 500. Thus the evidence, when viewed in a light most 
favorable to the trial court's decision, does not as a matter of 
law leave a reasonable doubt that defendant was entrapped. St;?te 
XJLJISSII, 728 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1986). 
THE PROSECUTOR LAID SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION AT 
TRIAL FOR ADMISSION OF THE DRUGS INTO 
EVIDENCE, AND THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
ADMITTING THE EXHIBITS. 
Defendant contends that the marijuana and cocaine sold 
to the undercover otficers on January 3, 1986 and January 10, 
1986 were admitted into evidence without proper foundation. 
Specifically, he alleges a defect in chain of custody because 
David Murdock, the state crime lab criminologist who accepted 
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custody ot a l l the e x h i b i t s from the p o l i c e o f f i cer who obtained 
them from the p o l i c e evidence l ocker , did not t e s t i f y ; nor did 
the c r i m i n o l o g i s t s who analyzed the e x h i b i t s t e s t i f y that they 
obtained them d i r e c t l y from Murdock. 
The governing l e g a l standards appl icable to a claim of 
i n s u t f i c i e n t foundation due to a l leged de fec t s in chain of 
custody were summarized by the Utah Supreme Court in State v . 
£ia&£h3SIi 680 P.2d 1036 (Utah 1984): 
Before real evidence can be admitted, the 
t r i a l court must be convinced that the 
proposed e x h i b i t i s in s u b s t a n t i a l l y the same 
condit ion when introduced into evidence as i t 
was when the crime was committed. Where the 
evidence has passed through several hands, 
circumstances surrounding chain of possess ion 
are re levant in making t h i s assessment. 
£±Si£_iU_*?3j3££Uf 28 Utah 2d 108, 498 P.2d 670 
(1972); Siaifi-Y^-ClfifilS, 98 Idaho 383, 565 
P.2d 576 (1977) . S&S 3l&2 29 Am. Jur. 2d 
Eyi<3fiD££r S 774 at 846 (1967). However, the 
party proffering the exh ib i t i s not required 
to e l iminate every conceivable p o s s i b i l i t y 
that the evidence may have been a l t e r e d . 
BaugllBan_£*_£iai£, 265 Ark. 869, 582 S.W.2d 4 
(1979); £i5i£-y-L-£J£Sinl£yr 18 Wash. App. 862, 
57 3 P.2d 30 (1977); SJfca4£-JTjL_Bflfig£S# 109 
Ariz . 196, 507 P.2d 121 (1973) . Some 
j u r i s d i c t i o n s have held that where no 
evidence has been offered to suggest 
tampering, proffered evidence i s admissible 
i f the chain of evidence i s otherwise 
adequately e s t a b l i s h e d . JLefe£a.y_Vj,_£±St£, 
Wyo., 589 P.2d 1292 (1979); £Jfcfl.t£JZA_fiflXiS r 
110 Ariz . 51 , 514 P.2d 1239 (1973); SpaiJss^^ 
StetSi 89 Nev. 84, 506 P.2d 1260 (1973) . A 
weak l ink in the chain and any doubt created 
by i t go to the weight to be given the 
evidence once the t r i a l court has exerc i sed 
the d i s c r e t i o n to conclude that in reasonable 
probabi l i ty the proffered evidence has not 
been changed in any important re spec t . iiJtaJtS 
XjLJZailQSi 240 Or. App. 283, 545 P.2d 604 
(1976); Sfli££_JU-Sifll£# 88 Nev. 350, 497 P.2d 
902 (1972). 
680 P.2d at 1039. 
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Since the handling of all four exhibits occurred in 
substantially the same way, and since defendant's allegation of 
defect in the chain of custody goes only to the link involving 
David Murdock as to each exhibit, a detailed examination of the 
handling of Exhibit 1 should suffice for purposes of tracing 
chain of custody, and in placing defendant's allegation in 
perspective. Exhibit 1 was the marijuana which Paquette obtained 
from defendant on January 3, 1986. The testimony at trial 
concerning Exhibit I may be summarized as follows: 
Paquette received the baggie of marijuana from 
defendant (Tr. 83), atter which she sealed and marked it, placed 
it into an envelope which she also marked and sealed, and then 
placed it into the night-deposit bin of the Salt Lake City 
evidence* room (Tr. 84-85, 96). Paquette testified that once the 
item was dropped into the evidence bin, it could only be 
retrieved through the evidence custodian (Tr. 96-97). Paquette 
identified the envelope in court as bearing her handwriting 
showing the date and time, and identified the contents (baggie) 
as also bearing her handwriting showing her IBM number and date 
(Tr. 84). She identified the exhibit as being the 1/4 ounce of 
suspected marijuana which she purchased from defendant and Tony 
on January 3, 1986 (Tr. 84). Earl Price, a police officer 
assigned to Metro Narcotics charged with handling evidence in 
narcotics cases, received the exhibit from the evidence custodian 
of the evidence room in Salt Lake City on January 7, 1986 (Tr. 
117 and 121). Price described the Salt Lake City Police 
Department evidence room as a locked, secured facility controlled 
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by an evidence custodian where evidence is held for purposes of 
later use in court (Tr. 117). Price further described the 
procedures for maintaining the security of evidence, including 
depositing and withdrawing items from the evidence room (Tr. 118-
121)* Price testified that when he received the exhibit from the 
evidence custodian, it was sealed and unopened (Tr. 121). He 
further identified markings on the exhibit which he had placed 
there showing the dates and times when he came into contact with 
it (Tr. 121). Price stated that he transported the exhibit from 
the evidence room in Salt Lake to the state toxicology laboratory 
to have it analyzed (Tr. 121). At that time he left it there, it 
was sealed and unopened (Tr. 121-22). Price gave the exhibit to 
David Murdock at the lab (Tr. 126) . Murdock was €>mployed at the 
State lab as a criminologist (Tr. 129). Terrance Weaver, another 
state lab analyst, testified and was qualified as an expert in 
the identification of controlled substances (Tr. 153). He 
identified the exhibit, stating that the envelope bore the 
laboratory case number, date of analysis and his initials (Tr. 
155)• He also identified the plastic baggie inside the envelope 
as having his seal on it with his initials, lab case number, and 
the date of which the contents were analyzed (Tr. 155)• He 
testified that at the time he began his analysis, the envelope 
was sealed (Tr. 158). After completing the analysis, he placed 
the sample back into the plastic bag, put his seal on it, placed 
the plastic bag into the envelope, placed his seal on the 
envelope and placed the evidence into the evidence locker room at 
the lab (Tr. 158). Weaver further described the evidence room 
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facility at the state lab, which is a locked facility, and 
indicated that there were established laboratory procedures for 
depositing and retrieving evidence from the locker, and that he 
followed such procedures with respect to the exhibit (Tr. 159). 
Earl Price testified that on January 16, 1986, he retrieved the 
exhibit from Weaver at the state lab, transported it back to the 
evidence room and placed it into evidence (Tr. 122 and 127)* 
Price also testified that as to all four exhibits, he followed 
established procedures set forth by his department for handling 
the exhibits (Tr. 125-26). 
It is submitted that the above-described trial 
testimony constitutes convincing evidence that the proposed 
exhibit was in substantially the same condition when introduced 
into evidence as it was when the crime was committed. State_, v* 
First, it is clear that the containers were the same 
ones initially received by the officers, in that in each case 
they bore the handwriting of the officers with other identifying 
information such as the date of each transaction (Tr. 84: Exh. 1; 
Tr. 95-96: Exh. 2; Tr. 88-89, 110-112, 133: Exh. 3; Tr. 93, 138: 
Exh. 4). 
Thus the question becomes, since the same containers 
the otficer initially received had been individually marked by 
them and were identified by them in court, could the contents 
somehow have been switched or altered? In that respect it is 
noteworthy that, as indicated above as to Exhibit 1, all exhibits 
were sealed by the officers prior to being placed into evidence, 
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were sealed when Price withdrew them from the evidence room, were 
sealed when he left them at the lab, were sealed when the 
toxicologists, Weaver and Smith, started their analysis, and were 
resealed by them when their analysis was complete. 
A claim of tampering seems particularly unlikely when 
it is recognized that, in the instant case, the otficers not only 
marked and identified the containers in which they initially 
received the drugs (i.e. baggie, bindle), but also placed those 
containers into envelopes which they also marked and identified. 
Thus if David Murdock had for any reason unsealed the envelopes 
and thereafter inadvertently placed the wrong samples inside and 
then resealed them, the mistake would have been evident because 
the containers inside the envelopes would not have had the 
officers1 markings on them. 
Terrance Weaver testified that the State lab 
established procedures for the deposit and retrieval of evidence 
from the lab's evidence locker (Tr. 159). David Murdock was a 
criminologist at the state lab (Tr. 128-29). Earl Price followed 
standard procedures into delivering the exhibits into the custody 
of the state lab (Tr. 125-26). The toxicologists followed 
standard procedures in their contact with the exhibits (Tr. 159, 
171-72). There is nothing in the record to suggest that the 
exhibits were altered or tampered with in any way. In order to 
imagine such a scenario one must supposed that between the time 
Murdock received the exhibits and the time they were placed in 
evidence at the lab, he or someone else unsealed the envelopes, 
removed the baggies or bindles therefore, unsealed those 
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containers as wel l* removed the substances which were o r i g i n a l l y 
ins ide the baggies or b ind les f replaced them with new mater ia l s , 
sealed the containers back upf placed the containers back in to 
the enve lopes , and resealed the enve lopes , a l l in such a manner 
as would show no s igns of tampering. 
As mentioned in BraJ5h£tfr Siapia# the party proffering 
evidence i s not required to e l iminate every conceivable 
p o s s i b i l i t y that the evidence may have been a l t e r e d . 680 P.2d a t 
1039. 
In Utah, there i s a presumption of regular i ty in the 
handling of evidence by p o l i c e or other publ ic o f f i c i a l s . An 
exh ib i t w i l l be excluded only i f there i s af f irmative evidence ot 
bad f a i t h or actual tampering jglaig^Yjt^Eaglg^gagJSjt^lDgA, 5 83 P.2d 
73 , 75 (Utah 1978) , c i t i n g UDiied^iaJtfi^YjL.Cofi^^sr 549 F.2d 
1303, 1306 (9th Cir . 1977) . Any gaps in the chain of custody go 
to the weight and not the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of the e x h i b i t s State v. 
Eagle PQQfr 538 P.2d a t 75 . 
In Sla:t£_Xx_Bia3£l)aH, 680 P.2d 1036 (Utah 1984) , the 
Utah Supreme Court was confronted with a s imilar claim of defect 
in chain of custody. The defendant disputed the cont inui ty of 
chain at the point where a sample of suspected marijuana was 
mailed to a s t a t e chemist for a n a l y s i s . The Court re jected h i s 
c la im, s t a t i n g that mailing narcot ics to a central laboratory 
does not neces sar i ly c o n s t i t u t e a break in the chain ot custody. 
The Court a l so focused on the point that no evidence was 
presented to suggest that mailing the sample resul ted in 
tampering or s u b s t i t u t i o n of evidence, glfidgfaatfr 680 P.2d at 
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1039. Further, the Court stated that the fact that the sample 
remained overnight in a box ready for mailing in a locked office 
of a sheriff whose deputies also had access to the office went to 
the weight of the evidence. Bi3d.Sil.3Jff 680 P.2d at 1039-40. 
If mailing a sample of suspected narcotics to the lab 
does not necessarily constitute a break in the chain of custody, 
certainly hand-delivering a sample to a criminologist at the lab, 
as occurred in the instant case, should not be considered a break 
in the chain. 
Furthermore, here, as in Bl3&sl)3ar no evidence was 
presented to suggest that the claimed defect in chain of custody 
resulted in tampering or substitution. Any claimed technical 
defect under the facts of this case would go to weight and not to 
admissibility. 
Due to the fact that the prosecutor laid sufficient 
foundation tnat the proposed exhibits were in fact the drugs 
purchased by the undercover officers on January 3, 1986 and 
January 10, 1986, and that in reasonable probability the 
proffered evidence had not been changed or altered, the court did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting the exhibits into evidence. 
QQEQhUSIQS 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's 
convictions should be attirmed. 
DATED this j^^Tday of December, 1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
CREIGHTON C. HORTON II 
Assistant Attorney General 
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I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, 
to J. Franklin Allred, and Margo L. James, attorneys for 
defendant, 321 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, this 
/ ' — day of December, 1987. 
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